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Abstract  Previous  studies  suggest  that  there  are  individual  differences  that  affect  the  way
that people  fake  their  responses  on  personality  measures  to  varying  degrees.  These  factors
should be  taken  into  account  to  obtain  more  accurate  information  regarding  faking  behavior.
This study  demonstrated  an  analysis  technique  that  can  accommodate  individual  differences  in
an experimentally  induced  faking  study.  This  mixed-design  experiment  used  two  randomized
groups (honest  vs.  faking  condition),  who  each  completed  a  five-factor  personality  measure
twice. This  study  analyzed  data  using  the  generalized  ANCOVA  (g-ANCOVA)  as  an  alternative  to
the traditional  ANCOVA,  since  the  g-ANCOVA  can  accommodate  both  individual  differences  in
prior manipulation  (covariates)  and  interaction,  estimating  the  effects  of  inducement  to  fake.
We also  demonstrated  the  use  of  EffectLite,  a  program  for  the  univariate  and  multivariate  anal-
ysis of  unconditional,  conditional,  and  average  mean  differences  between  groups,  and  which
supported the  present  study  by  providing  analysis  using  g-ANCOVA.







Aplicación  del  análisis  generalizado  de  la  covarianza  para  satisfacer  las  diferencias
individuales:  efecto  del  estudio  de  falsificación  de  la  prueba  de  personalidad
Resumen  Estudios  anteriores  sugieren  que  existen  diferencias  individuales  que  afectan  a  la
forma en  que  las  personas  falsifican  sus  respuestas  en  las  medidas  de  personalidad  en  diversos
grados. Estos  factores  deben  tenerse  en  cuenta  para  obtener  información  más  precisa  sobre
el comportamiento  falso.  Este  estudio  mostró  una  técnica  de  análisis  que  puede  adaptar  las
diferencias  individuales  en  un  estudio  de  la  falsificación  inducida  experimentalmente.  Este
experimento  de  diseño  mixto  contó  con  2  grupos  aleatorios  (forma  honrada  frente  a  falsa),
cada uno  de  los  cuales  cumplimentó  una  medida  de  personalidad  de  5  factores  2  veces.
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Este  estudio  analizó  los  datos  utilizando  el  ANCOVA  generalizado  (g-ANCOVA)  como  una  alterna-
tiva al  ANCOVA  tradicional  ya  que  el  g-ANCOVA  puede  adaptar  tanto  las  diferencias  individuales
con manipulación  previa  (covariables)  como  la  interacción,  estimando  los  efectos  de  la  induc-
ción a  la  falsificación.  También  mostramos  el  uso  de  EffectLite,  un  programa  para  el  análisis
univariable  y  multivariable  de  las  diferencias  de  medias  incondicionales,  condicionales  y  medias
entre los  grupos,  que  respaldó  el  presente  estudio  proporcionando  un  análisis  que  utilizó  el
g-ANCOVA.
© 2018  Universitat  de  Barcelona.  Publicado  por  Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  Todos  los  derechos
reservados.
Introduction
Experimentally  induced  faking  using  different  sets  of
instructions  has  been  widely  employed  in  many  studies
about  faking  (Griffith,  Chmielowski,  &  Yoshita,  2007;  Ziegler,
Schmidt-Atzert,  Bühner,  &  Krumm,  2007).  These  studies
have  followed  a  range  of  designs,  including  asking  par-
ticipants  to  respond  to  measures  according  to  different
instructions,  to  respond  as  honestly  possible,  to  fake  good
or  bad  responses,  and  to  respond  as  if  they  were  job  appli-
cants.  Comparing  the  obtained  scores  under  different  sets
of  instructions  can  explain  the  extent  to  which  individuals
could  successfully  fake  their  answers,  thereby  indicating  the
extent  to  which  personality  measures  are  fakable.  There
are  two  methods  to  examine  faking:  within-subject  and
between-subjects  designs.  Both  designs  contribute  to  under-
standing  faking  in  different  ways.  Within-subject  designs
reveal  how  individuals  can  enhance  their  obtained  score  by
faking,  and  between-subjects  designs  reveal  how  individu-
als  fake  their  responses  more  under  certain  circumstances.
Both  designs  confirm  that  people  can  fake  their  answers
to  personality  measures,  as  indicated  by  the  significant
score  differences  found  by  both  within-  and  between-
subjects  measurements.  However,  findings  are  inconsistent
with  respect  to  the  effects  of  the  specific  inducement  for
faking  on  individuals’  scores.  One  reason  for  these  mixed
results  may  be  due  to  the  limitations  of  study  designs,  or  in
the  analyses  used  to  compare  individual  differences  in  fak-
ing  (McFarland  &  Ryan,  2000).  Comparing  the  scores  from
different  conditions  (e.g.,  honest  vs.  faking)  is  less  infor-
mative  if  the  individuals  who  are  faking  do  so  to  different
degrees.
Previous  studies  found  evidence  for  the  presence  of  indi-
vidual  differences  in  faking,  with  varying  faking  intensity
scores  on  personality  measures  (Brown  &  Cothern,  2002;
McFarland  &  Ryan,  2000;  Rosse,  Stecher,  Miller,  &  Levin,
1998;  Widhiarso  &  Suhapti,  2009).  Individual  difference  in
faking  can  be  identified  by  several  parameters,  such  as
effect  sizes  and  pre-test  ×  group  interactions  (Viswesvaran
&  Ones,  1999),  correlation  between  individuals’  scores
under  honest  and  faking  conditions  (Brown  &  Cothern,  2002;
Longstaff  &  Jurgensen,  1953;  Mersman  &  Shultz,  1998),  rank
order  of  individuals  (Lautenschlager,  1986),  and  modera-
tion  processes  in  regression  analysis  (Holden,  2007;  Krahé,
Becker,  &  Zöllter,  2008).  Based  on  these  studies,  both  within
and  between-subjects  designs,  along  with  their  analytical
procedures  (e.g.,  t-testing),  tend  to  disregard  individual
differences  in  faking.  A  method  of  experimentally  induced
faking  that  can  incorporate  individual  differences  into  the
analysis  is  needed,  because  this  factor  misleads  the  mean
score  differences  being  examined.
A  meta-analysis  conducted  by  Viswesvaran  and  Ones
(1999)  compared  findings  from  within-  and  between-
subjects  study  designs.  The  authors  also  compared  the
effect  sizes  of  the  examined  studies.  They  found  that  par-
ticipants  could  elevate  their  scores  by  around  .75  standard
deviations  (d  =  .47  to  d  =  .93)  in  the  within-subject  studies,
and  by  around  .50  standard  deviations  (d  =  .48  to  d  =  .65)  in
the  between-subjects  studies.  The  authors  suggested  that
the  larger  effect  sizes  for  the  within-subject  designs  as
compared  to  the  between-subjects  designs  are  evidence  of
individual  variations  in  faking.  Differences  in  study  design
and  analytical  procedures  across  faking  studies  are  therefore
a  possible  reason  explaining  their  different  results.
Experimentally  induced  faking  using  sets  of  instructions
typically  uses  either  a  within-  (e.g.  Griffith  et  al.,  2007)
or  a  between-subjects  design  (e.g.  Ferrando  &  Anguiano-
Carrasco,  2009).  Recently,  a  few  studies  have  used  a  mixed
design  combining  within-  and  between-subjects  designs.  In
the  current  study,  we  use  a  mixed-design  method  to  examine
faking  behavior.  We  demonstrate  procedure  analysis  using
generalized  analysis  of  covariance  (g-ANCOVA)  as  a  method-
ology  to  investigate  individual  differences  in  faking  in  an
experimentally  induced  faking  study.  This  study  follows  the
theoretical  framework  established  by  Lubinski  (2000), who
stated  that  causal  models  of  a  phenomena  that  do  not  incor-
porate  individual  differences  in  variables  are  likely  to  be
underdetermined.  This  means  that  the  framework  for  inter-
preting  individual  faking  behavior  cannot  be  completely
justified  because  there  is  particular  variation  within  that
individual  that  might  bias  the  interpretation.  We  will  first
review  methodological  issues  associated  with  within-  and
between-subjects  faking  studies,  and  then  introduce  our
proposed  design  and  analysis  procedure.
Within-  and  between-subjects  designs
In  the  within-subject  design,  faking  is  operationally  defined
as  a  difference  in  scores  between  normal  and  faking
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conditions  (e.g.,  instructions  to  answer  honestly  or  to
fake  responses  to  achieve  a  specific  goal).  Measuring  the
same  individual  under  different  conditions  facilitates  the
researchers’  ability  to  estimate  the  individual  effects  of  fak-
ing.  This  design  answer  the  question  of  whether  participants
can  successfully  fake  the  measure,  as  evidenced  by  higher
scores  under  induced  faking  than  at  baseline  (e.g.,  pre-test).
One  of  the  advantages  of  the  within-subject  design  is  that  it
can  show  whether  faking  actually  occurred.  In  a  real-world
setting,  comparing  the  mean  scores  between  incumbents
and  job  applicants,  for  example,  will  usually  show  job  appli-
cants  to  obtain  higher  mean  scores.  Such  a  finding  allows
researchers  to  logically  assume  that  at  least  some  appli-
cants  do  fake,  but  it  is  difficult  to  draw  general  conclusions
from  this  analysis  (Griffith  et  al.,  2007).  With  regard  to  sta-
tistical  power,  given  an  equal  number  of  participants,  the
within-subject  design  is  more  powerful  than  the  between-
subjects  design.  However,  given  an  equal  number  of  tests,
the  between-subjects  design  is  also  powerful  because  of  the
slight  gain  in  the  degrees  of  freedom  (Viswesvaran  &  Ones,
1999).
Within-subject  designs  help  researchers  to  make  detailed
examinations  of  faking  behavior  at  the  individual  level.
Since  the  level  of  response  distortion  varies  across  indi-
viduals,  detailed  examination  is  considered  necessary  to
assess  dispositional  factors  that  might  affect  faking  variabil-
ity.  This  advantage  motivates  some  studies  to  categorize
individuals  based  on  how  much  their  score  changed  rela-
tive  to  measurement  error  (Griffith  et  al.,  2007;  Peterson,
Griffith,  Converse,  &  Gammon,  2011).  For  instance,  individ-
uals’  responses  could  be  flagged  as  likely  to  be  fake  if  the
change  in  their  score  between  the  honest  and  the  faking
condition  exceeded  the  interval  confidence  that  could  be
expected  based  on  the  measurement  error  derived  from  the
honest  condition.
However,  conclusions  drawn  from  studies  with  within-
subject  design  might  be  weak  because  individuals  can
develop  due  to  maturation,  learning,  experience,  and  histo-
rical  change  (Shadish,  Cook,  &  Campbell,  2002).  Therefore,
to  provide  the  strongest  evidence,  researchers  must  demon-
strate  that  none  of  these  confounders  took  place,  or  that,
if  they  did,  they  have  a  certain  structure  that  can  be  cor-
rected  for  (Steyer,  Partchev,  Kroehne,  Nagengast,  &  Fiege,
2011).  Another  issue  related  to  the  within-subject  design  in
faking  studies  is  the  order  in  which  instructions  are  given.
If  participants  take  the  test  only  twice  (i.e.,  honest  then
faking  condition),  the  study  is  limited  due  to  its  inabil-
ity  to  detect  if  results  would  be  the  same  if  the  order  of
instruction  was  reversed.  Score  differences  between  the
two  test  administrations  are  also  prone  to  be  impacted  by
situation-driven  fluctuations  (Ziegler,  MacCann,  &  Roberts,
2011).  Thus,  a  higher  score  for  the  faking  as  compared  to  the
honest  condition  reflects  a  natural  event,  because  the  situ-
ation  facilitates  individuals’  ability  to  do  so.  A  true-change
model  proposed  by  Steyer  (2005),  which  serves  as  an  exten-
sion  on  latent  state-trait  models,  can  be  adopted  to  address
this  issue.
In  the  between-subjects  design,  researchers  compare
score  differences  between  two  random  groups  of  partici-
pants,  for  example,  honest  vs.  faking  or  job  applicants
vs.  incumbents.  This  design  assumes  that  participants  who
receive  specific  instructions  to  fake  their  responses  are
willing  and  able  to  do  so.  This  design  also  assumes  that  par-
ticipants  who  do  not  receive  specific  instructions  to  fake
their  responses  are  not  motivated  to  distort  their  responses.
The  between-subjects  design  has  the  advantage  of  simplic-
ity.  This  simplicity  has  made  the  between-subjects  design
increasingly  popular  among  researchers.  This  design  also
facilitates  researchers’  ability  to  use  advanced  procedures
to  examine  faking,  such  as  differential  item  functioning
(Stark,  Chernyshenko,  Chan,  Lee,  &  Drasgow,  2001),  Mixed
Rasch  Modeling  (Eid  &  Zickar,  2007) or  multiple  group  anal-
ysis  structural  equation  modeling  (SEM;  Frei,  Griffith,  Snell,
McDaniel,  &  Douglas,  1997).
Under  quasi-experimental  designs,  the  mean  differences
between  groups  are  more  systematic  than  random  (Shadish
et  al.,  2002).  Between-subjects  designs  are  vulnerable  to
the  influence  of  third  variables  or  confounders  due  to  group-
level  inequalities  in  characteristics.  These  factors  may  lead
to  inadequate  conclusions,  as  the  heterogeneity  of  variance
across  groups  is  substantial  (Bryk  &  Raudenbush,  1988).  Het-
erogeneity  occurs  when  inducement  to  fake  has  an  effect
on  some  participants  but  not  on  others;  this  may  be  caused
by  technical  problems  such  unclear  instructions,  as  well  as
by  differential  participant  responsiveness.  Individual  differ-
ences  can  affect  faking  variance,  as  participants  may  react
differently  to  instructions  to  fake.  Previous  authors  sug-
gested  that  individual  differences  associated  with  faking
might  be  quite  complex,  since  this  phenomenon  combines
both  willingness  (e.g.,  motivation)  and  ability  to  fake  one’s
responses  (Ferrando  &  Anguiano-Carrasco,  2011;  McFarland
&  Ryan,  2000).
Two  other  interesting  issues  regarding  the  between-
group  design  are  interaction  (sets  of  instructions  ×  individual
trait  or  ability)  and  measurement  invariance.  If  inter-
action  occurs,  the  interpretation  of  mean  differences
between  groups  becomes  problematic  (Viswesvaran  &  Ones,
1999);  measurement  invariance  of  the  measure  across
two  groups  makes  mean  score  differences  meaningless
(Peterson,  Griffith,  O’Connell,  &  Isaacson,  2008).  Evidence
of  an  interaction  would  suggest  that  the  findings  from  pre-
vious  research  on  inventory  distortion  that  use  repeated
measure  designs  should  not  be  generalized  to  a  non-pre-
tested  population.  For  example,  previous  faking  research
may  not  be  applicable  to  selection  generalization,  since  it
is  commonly  assumed  that  job  applicants  have  no  previous
experience  with  the  personality  inventory  being  used  in  the
employment  procedure  (Schwab,  1971).
Mixed  designs  and  generalized  ANCOVA
Ideally,  a  design  that  includes  both  a  within  and  a  between-
subjects  design  (mixed-design) can  generate  the  most
useful  and  interpretable  results.  The  within-subject  design
is  appropriate  for  examining  faking  at  an  individual  level,
while  the  between-subjects  design  allows  researchers  to
compare  groups.  In  the  mixed  design,  participants  are
randomly  assigned  to  one  of  two  groups.  The  first  group
(control)  completes  the  scale  twice,  both  times  under
honest  instruction,  while  the  second  group  (manipulated)
completes  the  measure  first  under  honest,  and  then  under
faking  instruction.  While  a  within-subject  design  would
eliminate  sequence  effects  and  a  between-subjects  design
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would  eliminate  period  effects  (Putt,  2005),  a  mixed  design
can  remove  both  of  these  limitations.
The  way  in  which  faking  is  operationalized  determines
the  experimental  design,  as  well  as  the  analytical  proce-
dure.  For  instance,  faking  that  is  operationalized  as  the
change  in  scores  between  the  honest  and  the  faking  condi-
tion  uses  a  within-subject  design,  and  applies  t-testing  to
examine  the  change  in  scores.  Ideally,  even  when  faking  is
defined  in  different  ways  and  examined  using  studies  with
different  designs,  the  analysis  will  produce  similar  results.
This  similarity  can  be  indicated  when  the  effect  sizes  of
inducement  to  fake  for  both  within  and  between-subjects
designs  are  approximately  equal.  This  goal  can  be  achieved
by  sampling  participants  by  perfect  random.  Theoretically,
perfectly  random  sampling  ensures  that  study  participants
have  the  same  characteristics,  making  their  responses  under
given  inducements  homogeneous.  Hence,  the  average  total
effect  of  inducement  to  fake  across  individuals  will  be  the
main  effect  of  the  treatment  factor  in  orthogonal  analysis  of
variance.  For  further  discussion  of  this  issue,  the  interested
reader  can  consult  Steyer.
However,  completely  randomized  designs  are  limited
due  to  the  inability  of  researchers  to  eliminate  the  effect
of  confounding  variables  on  the  outcome.  Steyer  demon-
strated  how  the  effect  sizes  of  treatments  can  reverse  signs
when  prior  treatment  variables  are  involved  in  the  analysis,
despite  the  fact  that  the  data  are  obtained  from  random-
ized  experiments.  Involving  prior  treatment  variables  is  the
same  as  including  a  pre-test  in  the  analysis  when  examining
post-test  mean  differences  between  manipulated  and  con-
trol  groups.  Therefore,  including  pre-tests  in  ANCOVA  tests
of  post-test  differences  between  groups  has  become  popular
among  researchers.
Mixed  designs  are  recommended  because  they  support
empirical  tests  of  interaction  effects,  which  cannot  be
employed  on  either  within-  or  between-subjects  designs.
Although  interaction  effects  in  research  on  faking  have  been
assumed  not  to  exist,  as  randomized  designs  were  imple-
mented  (Viswesvaran  &  Ones,  1999),  at  a  certain  point
interactions  will  impact  substantive  meaning  (see  Steyer
&  Partchev,  2008).  Interactions  refer  to  all  constellations
in  which  the  effect  of  manipulation  on  faking  behavior  is
not  constant  across  different  levels  of  individual  attributes.
Interactions  are  difficult  to  avoid  because  there  are  indi-
vidual  differences  in  faking,  caused  by  situational  factors
and  differences  in  ability  and  motivation.  In  experimen-
tally  induced  faking,  participants  may  react  differently  to
instructions;  some  participants  are  motivated  to  fake  a  great
deal,  while  others  may  not  fake  at  all  (Corr  &  Gray,  1995).
We  recommend  mixed  designs  because  they  strengthen
the  conclusions  that  can  be  made  regarding  individual  fak-
ing,  providing  the  strongest  interpretation  (Griffith  et  al.,
2007).  Previous  research  on  faking  has  employed  various
partial  approaches.  Two  studies  simply  focused  on  score
comparisons  within  individuals  asked  to  respond  honestly
and  to  fake  (within-subject  design;  (e.g.  Lautenschlager,
1986;  Peterson,  Griffith,  &  Converse,  2009)  while  others
focused  on  comparisons  between  groups  under  different
instructions  (between-subjects  design;  (e.g.  Holden,  2008;
Martin,  Bowen,  &  Hunt,  2002).  Several  studies  have  already
employed  mixed  designs.  For  example,  McFarland  and  Ryan
(2000)  and  Scherbaum  (2003)  used  a  2  ×  2  mixed-design
with  two  instruction  conditions  (honest  vs.  fake)  as  the
within-subject  factor,  and  the  order  of  instructions  as  the
between-subjects  factor.  Our  design  in  the  current  study  is
similar  to  Ferrando  and  Anguiano-Carrasco’s  (2011)  design,
which  employed  a  2  ×  2  mixed  design  with  two  groups
(control  and  manipulated)  as  the  between-subjects  fac-
tor.
As  discussed  earlier,  ANCOVA  is  a  recommended  pro-
cedure  for  analyzing  the  data  from  mixed-design  studies.
This  procedure  examines  the  post-test  difference  between
means  for  two  groups  using  pre-test  scores  as  a  covariate.
However,  this  method  does  not  allow  for  interactions  (pre-
test  ×  groups),  and  instead  assumes  the  regression  slopes
across  the  groups  to  be  homogeneous.  Consequently,  an
interaction  is  defined  as  a  variation  that  is  not  explained
by  ANCOVA  because  it  is  unmodeled.  A  method  of  analysis
that  can  examine  mean  differences  even  when  an  interac-
tion  is  present  is  required.  To  resolve  this  problem,  Steyer,
Partchev,  Kröhne,  Nagengast,  and  Fiege  (2008)  showed  how
traditional  ANCOVA  models  can  be  generalized  to  allow
interactions  between  groups  and  the  covariates:  generalized
analysis  of  covariance  (g-ANCOVA).
In  g-ANCOVA,  covariate  treatment  interactions  are  taken
into  account,  allowing  treatment  effects  to  be  larger  or
smaller  depending  on  the  values  of  the  covariate(s).  For
example,  if  researchers  were  examining  faking  using  a
mixed-design  study,  they  would  divide  the  participants
into  two  groups  (control  and  manipulated).  Both  groups
would  be  pre-tested  under  the  same  honest  instruction,  and
then  post-tested  after  receiving  different  instructions:  the
manipulated  group  would  be  instructed  in  such  a  way  as  to
induce  faking.  In  this  example,  the  researchers  could  con-
trast  the  manipulated  (X  =  1)  to  the  control  group  (X  =  0)
to  estimate  the  effects  of  inducement  to  fake.  Using  the
pre-test  (Z)  as  a  covariate,  the  regression  model  esti-
mating  the  effects  of  inducement  can  be  expressed  as
E(Y|X,Z)  =  g0(Z)  +  g1(Z)·X.  Using  regression  modeling  terms,
g0(Z)  refers  to  intercept  function  and  g1(Z)  refers  to  slope
or  effect  function.
Since  the  covariate  Z  is  continuous  (z1,  z2, . .  ., zk),  the
effects  gx(z)  of  X may  be  different  for  different  values  of
the  covariate.  Thus,  there  are  several  effect  functions  g1(Z)
regarding  the  range  of  covariate  values.  Taking  the  aver-
age  of  these  functions  gives  E[g1(Z)],  which  refers  to  the
average  effects  of  inducement  to  fake.  Another  part  of  the
model,  g1(Z)·X,  can  also  be  derived  regarding  the  number
of  groups  (X  =  1  and  X  =  0).  Hence,  E[g1(Z)|X  =  1]  is  the  aver-
age  effect  of  inducement  to  fake  that  would  be  estimated
if  everyone  in  the  manipulated  group  received  instructions
to  fake,  compared  with  if  participants  in  this  group  did  not
receive  an  inducement  to  fake.  Moreover,  E[g1(Z)|X  = 0]  is  the
average  effect  of  inducement  to  fake  on  the  control  group
if  the  participants  in  this  group  received  the  treatment,  as
compared  to  if  no  participants  in  this  group  received  instruc-
tions  to  fake.  When  average  effects  and  average  effects
given  a treatment  condition  are  estimated,  then  two  effect
sizes  are  produced.  One  effect  size  is  estimated  for  aver-
age  effects  E[g1(Z)]  and  two  effect  sizes  are  estimated  for
average  effects  given  a  treatment  condition  (E[g1(Z)|X  =  1]
and  E[g1(Z)|X  =  0]).  According  to  this  approach,  the  effect
sizes  are  estimated  by  dividing  the  effect  by  the  standard
deviation  of  the  outcome  variable  in  the  control  group.
Applying  generalized  analysis  of  covariance  for  accommodating  individual  difference  85
Purposes  of  the  present  study
The  aim  of  the  present  study  is  to  demonstrate  the  use  of
an  analysis  technique  that  can  accommodate  individual  dif-
ferences  in  a  study  on  experimentally  induced  faking.  We
demonstrate  that  using  g-ANCOVA  as  an  alternative  to  tra-
ditional  ANCOVA  can  handle  interaction  terms  to  estimate
the  effect  of  inducement  to  fake.  We  examine  two  primary
coefficients  that  describe  the  effect  of  inducement  to  fake:
average  effect  and  conditional  effect.  EffectLite  (Steyer  &
Partchev,  2008),  a  program  for  the  univariate  and  multivari-
ate  analysis  of  unconditional,  conditional,  and  average  mean
differences  between  groups,  supports  our  endeavor,  since
this  program  can  provide  analysis  using  g-ANCOVA.
Method
Participants
Participants  were  students  enrolled  in  undergraduate
courses  through  the  Faculty  of  Psychology,  Universitas  Gad-
jah  Mada,  Indonesia.  After  removing  cases  with  missing  data,
the  total  number  of  remaining  participants  was  182  (54%
female  and  46%  male;  ages  19--26  years  old).
Measures
This  study  employed  the  Big  Five  Inventory  (BFI-44;  John
&  Srivastava,  1999)  to  measure  the  five  personality  traits
of  extraversion,  emotional  stability,  agreeableness,  con-
scientiousness,  and  openness  to  experience.  This  measure
consists  of  44  Likert-type  items  on  a  5-point  scale.  The  alpha
coefficients  for  the  measures  of  the  aforementioned  five
traits  were  .88,  .84,  .79,  .82,  and  .81,  respectively.
Procedures
The  current  study  employed  a  2  ×  2  mixed  design  with  two
groups  who  each  completed  the  assessment  twice  (two
weeks  apart).  Participants  were  randomly  assigned  to  the
control  (honest  group)  or  the  manipulated  group  (faking
group).  Participants  in  the  control  group  completed  the
measure  twice,  both  times  under  standard  instructions.
Participants  in  the  faking  group  completed  the  measure
twice,  but  under  two  different  sets  of  instructions,  standard
instructions  and  instructions  to  fake.  Under  the  standard
instructions,  participants  were  asked  to  complete  the  scale
as  honestly  as  possible,  while  under  the  instructions  to  fake,
participants  were  asked  to  make  as  good  an  impression  as
possible;  i.e.,  to  respond  as  if  they  were  applying  for  a
job.  To  make  the  job  offered  relevant  to  the  participants’
field  of  study  (psychology),  we  chose  clinical  psychologist  as
the  job  being  offered.  Since  this  study  employed  an  exper-
imental  design,  the  term  treatment  is  sometimes  used  in
this  paper  to  refer  to  inducement  to  fake  (the  manipulation
variable)  and  pre-test  and  post-test  refer  to  the  first  and
second  times,  respectively,  that  participants  completed  the
assessment.
Table  1  Comparison  of  means  and  standard  deviations  of
the measures  for  honest  and  faking  groups  (pre-test  and  post-
test).
Group  Measure  Pre-test  Post-test
M  SD  M  SD
Honest
group
Extraversion  3.481  .671  4.185  .511
Agreeableness  4.023 .423 4.412  .395
Conscientiousness  3.369 .625 4.362 .508
Emotional  stability 2.991 .625 3.656 .397
Openness  3.650  .528  4.044  .425
Social desirability  9.222  2.498  --  --
Faking
group
Extraversion  3.417  .616  3.605  .629
Agreeableness  3.929  .480  3.806  .628
Conscientiousness  3.331  .535  3.524  .618
Emotional  stability  3.010  .648  3.080  .607
Openness  3.595  .489  3.800  .458
Social desirability  11.424  7.050  --  --
M, mean; SD,  standard deviation. Participants in the honest
group were instructed to complete the measure honestly, while
the faking group was only instructed to complete the measure
honestly the first time (Time 1).
Data  analysis
g-ANCOVA  was  analyzed  using  EffectLite  v.3.1.2  (Steyer  &
Partchev,  2008),  a  statistical  package  for  integrated  analy-
sis,  to  estimate  average  and  conditional  effects.  EffectLite
has  been  developed  especially  for  the  analysis  of  covari-
ate  treatment-outcome  designs  with  treatment  and  control
groups.  The  advantages  of  this  program  are  that  it  does  not
require  homogeneity  of  variances  or  covariance  matrices;
it  can  handle  several  manifest  and  latent  outcome  varia-
bles,  even  if  outcomes  are  mixed;  it  facilitates  the  analysis
of  conditional  and  average  effects;  and  it  estimates  and
tests  the  average  effects  for  non-orthogonal  analysis  of  vari-
ance  designs  for  qualitative  covariates.  The  analysis  was
performed  five  times,  corresponding  to  the  number  of  per-
sonality  factors,  using  post-test  as  the  dependent  variable;
different  instruction  condition  as  group;  and  pre-test  score
of  the  five  personality  measures,  gender,  and  social  desir-
ability  measure  as  the  covariates.  We  used  fully  stochastic




Descriptive  statistics  of  the  data  are  presented  in  Table  1.
Personality  factor  scores  were  computed  from  summed
scores  divided  by  the  number  of  items  for  that  factor.  Since
possible  item  scores  range  from  1  to  5,  with  the  exception
of  the  social  desirability  measure,  the  hypothetical  mean
score  of  each  factor  is  3.  Means  scores  for  the  personality
measure  exceeded  three  for  both  the  honest  and  the  faking
condition,  meaning  that  participants’  scores  for  both  con-
ditions  were  above  average.  Participants’  mean  scores  for
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Table  2  Simultaneous  tests  using  chi-squared  for  all  faking  groups  and  all  dependent  variables.
Test  hypothesis  E  A  C  Es  O
Test  of  equivalence  of  adjusted  means  to  raw  means  4.165  (2)a 2.397  (2)  4.047  (2)  0.125  (2)  0.006  (2)
No average  treatment  effect  (E(g1)  =  0)  68.803  (1)*** 69.174  (1)*** 91.365  (1)*** 55.644  (1)*** 12.526  (1)***
No  covariate  effect  in  control  group  (g0 =  constant)  43.241  (7)*** 30.879  (7)*** 10.139  (7)  7.957  (7)  8.362  (7)
No treatment  ×  covariate  interaction  (g1 =  constant)  16.016  (7)** 11.661  (7)  13.256  (7)  3.639  (7)  31.912  (7)***
No  treatment  effects  (g1 =  0)  97.291  (8)*** 95.825  (8)*** 110.244  (8)*** 61.701  (8)*** 46.587  (8)***
E, extraversion; A, agreeableness; C, conscientiousness; Es, emotional stability; O, openness.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p  < 0.001.
a Degree of freedom of the test noted in parentheses.
those  in  the  faking  condition  were  higher  than  for  those  in
the  honest  condition  for  all  five  factors  of  the  assessment.
Initial  analysis
This  section  will  present  the  results  of  the  analysis  in  accor-
dance  with  the  flow  of  the  analysis  provided  by  EffectLite.
The  initial  part  of  the  output  analysis  was  a  simulta-
neous  test  as  to  whether  covariate  means  were  equal
between  treatment  groups.  This  information  is  useful  for
initial  screening  to  ensure  that  randomization  does  not
fail  due  to,  for  example,  systematic  attrition.  This  allows
researchers  to  be  sure  that  participants  are  comparable,
so  that  the  total  effect  of  the  intervention  on  the  out-
come  variable  can  be  confidently  estimated  (Steyer,  Fiege,
&  Rose,  2010).  A  simultaneous  test  of  the  equivalence  of
covariate  means  between  groups  yielded  a  non-significant
result  (2 =  10.094;  p  <  0.05).  This  result  confirms  that  ran-
domization  in  this  study  was  comparable  to  a  perfectly
randomized  experiment,  meaning  that  average  treatment
effects  (after  adjusting  for  the  covariates)  will  remain  close
to  the  unconditional  mean  differences  (Steyer  &  Partchev,
2008).  Similarly,  a  simultaneous  test  of  whether  all  adjusted
means  were  equal  to  the  corresponding  raw  means  also
yielded  non-significant  results  for  all  five  analyses  (see  sec-
ond  row  of  Table  2).  These  results  indicate  an  equivalence
between  the  adjusted  and  corresponding  raw  means  scores,
indicating  that  an  analysis  without  covariates  is  sufficient  to
make  inferences  about  the  effect  of  inducement  to  fake.
However,  we  still  included  these  covariates  in  additional
analyses  as  this  may  increase  the  power  of  statistical  tests,
or  shed  light  on  possible  interactions  between  covariates
and  the  treatment  variable  (Steyer  &  Partchev,  2008).
Simultaneous  analysis
Table  2  also  presents  simultaneous  tests  for  groups  and
dependent  variables.  The  null  hypothesis  test  --  that  there
will  be  no  average  treatment  effect  and  no  treatment
effects  --  was  rejected  for  all  five-factor  measures.  For
example,  the  average  effect  of  inducement  to  fake  was
significant  for  extraversion  (2 =  68.803;  p  <  0.001),  which
describes  the  effect  of  inducement  to  fake  in  the  par-
ticipants  (Steyer  et  al.,  2011).  The  magnitude  effect  of
inducement  to  fake  was  significant  (2 =  117.059;  p  <  0.001),
in  term  that  the  effect  is  far  from  zero  effect  as  labeled  by
g1 =  0.  EffectLite  also  indicated  that  the  intercept  remained
constant  (g0 =  constant),  indicating  there  was  no  covari-
ate  effect  in  either  the  control  group  or  the  constancy
slope  (g1 =  constant),  indicating  the  presence  of  treat-
ment  ×  covariate  interaction.
Regarding  both  statistics,  significant  covariate  effects
existed  for  the  control  group  for  both  extraversion
(2 =  43.241;  p  <  0.001)  and  openness  (2 =  30.879;
p  < 0.001),  indicating  that  an  individual’s  performance
on  the  second  test  administration  would,  under  normal
conditions  (i.e.,  no  instructions  to  fake)  depend  on  his  or
her  previous  performances  (e.g.,  social  desirability  score).
This  information  is  important  in  making  causal  inferences,
because  it  explains  that  this  effect  --  subsequent  perfor-
mances  being  affected  by  prior  performances  --  might  also
occur  in  the  faking  group.  Thus,  participants’  scores  on
subsequent  measures  were  not  only  affected  by  inducement
to  fake,  but  also  by  their  prior  performance.  We  also  found
significant  interactions  between  treatment  group  and
covariates  in  extraversion  (2 =  16.016;  p  <  0.05)  and  open-
ness  (2 =  31.912;  p  <  0.001);  these  findings  indicate  that
individuals  with  particular  characteristics,  as  specified  by
their  scores  on  the  covariate  variables,  fake  their  response
to  a greater  degree  than  others.
Average  and  conditional  effect  analysis
This  section  present  the  results  of  analyses  related  to  sig-
nificance  testing  of  the  estimated  coefficients.  Applying
g-ANCOVA  using  EffectLite  yielded  a  significant  average
effect  of  inducement  to  fake  for  all  five-factor  personality
measures  (Table  3).  The  coefficient  values  of  the  average
effect  ranged  from  .231  to  .843,  indicating  that  inducement
to  fake  successfully  motivated  participants  to  fake  their
responses.  The  two  highest  effects  were  found  for  conscien-
tiousness  (estimated  effect  =  .843;  p  <  0.001;  d  =  1.357)  and
extraversion  (estimated  effect  =  .655;  p  < 0.001;  d  =  1.046).
Table  4  presents  the  effect  of  inducement  to  fake,  taking
into  account  gender,  social  desirability,  and  five-factor  per-
sonality  measure  scores  as  covariates.  The  significant  effects
of  the  covariates  on  faking  behavior  were  found  in  sev-
eral  measures.  For  example,  social  desirability  (estimated
effect  =  −0.04;  p  <  0.05)  and  emotional  stability  (estimated
effect  =  0.194;  p  <  0.001),  both  significantly  affected  indi-
vidual  faking  on  the  agreeableness.  Significant  effects
of  covariates  on  faking  were  also  found  for  extraver-
sion  (covariated  by  emotional  stability),  conscientiousness
Applying  generalized  analysis  of  covariance  for  accommodating  individual  difference  87
Table  3  Effect  of  inducement  to  fake  on  treatment  group  estimated  by  a  generalized  analysis  of  covariance  using  EffectLite.
Dependent  variables  Average  effect  of  inducement  [E(g1)]  SE  da R2
Extraversion  0.655*** 0.079  1.046  0.433
Agreeableness  0.619*** 0.074  0.987  0.421
Conscientiousness  0.843*** 0.088  1.357  0.433
Emotional stability  0.579*** 0.078  0.961  0.291
Openness 0.231*** 0.065  0.506  0.281
SE,  standard error; [E(g1)], average effect.
a Effect size was computed by dividing the estimated treatment effect by the standard deviation of the outcome variable in the control
group.
*** p < 0.001.
Table  4  The  intercept  function  (g0)  and  effect  function  (g1)  of  inducement  to  fake  on  the  five  factors  of  personality.
Dependent  variable  Function  Intercept  Covariates
Gender  SDS  E  A  C  Es  O
E g0 3.386*** 0.124  0.049*** 0.116  0.118  −0.112  −0.135  −0.13
SE 0.778  0.112  0.008  0.09  0.115  0.102  0.085  0.111
g1 −1.009  −0.102  −0.016  0.121  −0.132  0.006  0.347** 0.255
SE 1.015  0.147  0.023  0.128  0.163  0.134  0.115  0.158
A g0 2.422** −0.026  0.038*** 0.207* 0.068  −0.168  −0.058  0.201*
SE  0.818  0.118  0.008  0.094  0.121  0.107  0.089  0.117
g1 0.24  −0.028  −0.04* −0.127  0.104  0.161  0.194* −0.081
SE 0.973  0.141  0.019  0.12  0.153  0.128  0.109  0.148
C g0 2.532** −0.186  −0.019* 0.115  0.198  0.011  −0.012  0.037
SE 0.888 0.128  0.009  0.102  0.132  0.117  0.097  0.127
g1 −0.576 0.16 0.061** −0.269* 0.033  0.177  0.072  0.19
SE 1.124 0.163 0.024 0.141  0.179  0.148  0.126  0.174
Es g0 3.621*** 0.014  −0.003  0.200* 0.017  −0.167  −0.028  −0.168
SE 0.871  0.126  0.009  0.101  0.129  0.115  0.095  0.124
g1 −0.188  −0.059  0.007  −0.162  −0.011  0.122  0.111  0.163
SE 1.045  0.152  0.021  0.129  0.165  0.138  0.117  0.16
O g0 3.799*** −0.063  0.005  −0.066  −0.019  0.211* −0.011  −0.087
SE 0.658  0.095  0.007  0.076  0.098  0.086  0.072  0.094
g1 −1.645* 0.082  0.005  0.129  −0.044  −0.227  0.084  0.554***
SE  0.814  0.118  0.017  0.101  0.129  0.107  0.091  0.125
SDS, social desirability; E, extraversion; A, agreeableness; C, conscientiousness; Es, emotional stability; O, openness.
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
*** p < 0.001.
(covariated  by  social  desirability  and  extraversion),  and
openness  (covariated  by  openness  in  pre-test).
Concerns  regarding  the  effect  of  social  desirability  on
faking  are  still  strong  in  research  on  faking  (Anguiano-
Carrasco,  Vigil-Colet,  &  Ferrando,  2013).  We  therefore
compared  the  results  from  analyzing  the  data  using  a  dif-
ferent  method.  The  first  procedure  employed  g-ANCOVA,
while  the  second  used  traditional  ANCOVA,  which  assumes
no  interaction  between  pre-test  and  group;  this  latter  anal-
ysis  technique  is  commonly  used  in  experimentally  induced
faking  studies.  We  only  analyzed  faking  with  regard  to
extraversion,  emotional  stability,  and  openness,  since  our
results  had  shown  that  social  desirability  did  not  affect
faking  on  those  measures.  This  analysis  yielded  different
results,  similar  to  our  previous  result,  g-ANCOVA  consistently
found  a  no  significant  effect  of  social  desirability  on  faking
on  extraversion,  emotional  stability,  and  openness,  while
ANCOVA  found  a  non-significant  effect  of  social  desirabil-
ity  only  on  emotional  stability.  However,  the  purpose  of  this
comparison  was  only  to  demonstrate  that  the  use  of  dif-
ferent  analytical  techniques  can  produce  different  findings;
this  needs  to  be  explored  further  in  later  studies.
Discussion
The  aim  of  this  study  was  to  demonstrate  the  use  of  analy-
sis  techniques  that  can  accommodate  individual  differences
in  experimentally  induced  faking  studies.  In  this  design,
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the  term  treatment  refers  to  the  use  of  modified  instruc-
tions  to  stimulate  participants  to  fake  their  responses.  We
used  g-ANCOVA  can  handle  interaction  terms  to  estimate  the
effect  of  inducement  to  fake  as  an  alternative  to  the  tradi-
tional  ANCOVA.  We  examined  two  primary  coefficients  that
describe  the  effect  of  inducement  to  fake:  average  effect
and  conditional  effect.  EffectLite  supported  our  goals,  since
this  program  can  estimate  the  average  effect  of  treatment
on  the  total  sample,  as  well  as  the  conditional  treatment
effects  given  specific  treatment  conditions.
In  the  initial  analysis,  we  found  that  the  means  of
all  variables  that  were  treated  as  covariates  were  equal
between  participant  groups.  This  means  that  the  random-
ization  for  this  study  fulfilled  one  of  the  requirements
for  perfectly  randomized  experiments.  Another  analysis
(testing  for  equivalence  between  adjusted  means  and  the
corresponding  raw  means)  was  conducted  for  all  five-
factor  measures  separately  have  supported  this  finding.
This  finding  indicates  that  an  analysis  without  covariates
is  sufficient  to  make  inferences  regarding  the  effect  of
inducement  to  fake.  Theoretically,  in  this  situation,  the
average  treatment  effects,  after  adjusting  for  the  covari-
ates,  will  be  close  to  the  unconditional  mean  differences.
Both  tests  (equivalence  of  covariates  between  faking  and
honest  groups  and  equivalence  between  adjusted  means
and  the  corresponding  raw  means)  are  the  first  screening
tests  to  provide  important  information  about  the  appro-
priate  use  of  the  covariates  involved  in  the  analysis.
However,  the  covariates  were  still  included  in  subsequent
analyses.  Further,  more  detailed  analyses  indicated  that
several  covariates  significantly  affected  both  intercept  (g0)
and  effect  function  (g1).  For  example,  for  extraversion,
social  desirability  increased  the  intercept  function,  while
emotional  stability  increased  the  effect  function.  These
results  indicate  that  the  inclusion  of  a  covariate  in  the
analysis  of  inducement  to  fake  can  produce  interesting
findings  even  the  experiment  conducts  random  assign-
ment.
Study  findings  supported  the  expectations  regarding  the
effectiveness  of  inducement  to  fake,  as  mean  scores  for  the
faking  group  were  higher  than  means  scores  for  the  hon-
est  group  for  all  five  personality  measures.  These  results
indicate  that  the  effort  to  induce  participants  to  fake  their
responses  was  quite  successful.  Since  analyses  incorporated
several  covariates,  the  average  effect  in  this  context  refers
to  averages  of  the  conditional  mean  differences.  Hence,  this
effect  differs  with  regard  to  the  effect  of  inducement  to  fake
reported  by  research  that  did  not  include  an  analysis  of  a
covariate  or  covariates;  compared  with  the  results  of  pre-
vious  studies,  the  effect  sizes  reported  in  the  current  study
are  higher.  For  example,  the  magnitude  of  the  effect  sizes
using  the  set  of  covariates  in  the  present  study  was  larger
than  the  effect  sizes  for  Viswesvaran  and  Ones’  (1999)  study,
which  yielded  effect  sizes  ranging  from  over  .66  (agreeable-
ness)  to  .96  (conscientiousness);  in  contrast,  our  analyses
yielded  effect  sizes  ranging  from  .506  (openness)  to  1.357
(conscientiousness).
One  possible  cause  of  these  differences  is  whether  the
covariate  or  covariates  were  included  in  the  analysis.  We
found  that,  for  measures  that  yielded  a  significant  effect  of  a
covariate  on  faking  behavior,  excluding  that  covariate  in  the
analysis  yielded  a  decreased  effect  size.  For  example,  for
extraversion,  when  this  covariate  was  included  in  analysis,
the  effect  size  was  1.046;  when  this  covariate  was  excluded
from  the  analysis,  the  effect  size  was  reduced  to  0.921.  Sim-
ilar  results  were  also  found  for  agreeableness  and  emotional
stability;  in  contrast,  the  effect  size  was  stable  for  consci-
entiousness  and  openness.  We  assume  that  these  findings
are  due  to  the  capability  of  g-ANCOVA  to  include  variation
in  faking,  thus  making  the  pooled  standard  deviation  less
contaminated  by  faking  variance.  Hence,  although  our  anal-
ysis  found  that  adjusted  means  were  equal  to  raw  means
for  all  five  personality  measures,  employing  the  covari-
ates  in  the  analysis  is  still  suggested.  Using  covariates  also
allows  researchers  to  examine  possible  interactions  between
covariates  and  the  treatment,  and  employing  covariates
can  increase  the  effect  size,  as  demonstrated  in  this  study.
Zickar  and  Robie  (1999)  support  this  suggestion,  as  they
found  that  the  effect  size  of  faking  is  always  larger  when  the
pooled  standard  deviation,  which  has  less  contamination,  is
used.
Result  of  analysis  found  interactions  between  covariates
and  participant  group  for  extraversion  and  openness.  This
finding  indicates  that  mean  differences  in  post-test  scores
between  the  groups  were  different  according  to  different
values  of  the  covariates;  i.e.,  the  relationship  between  the
covariate  and  the  post-test  score  differs  between  groups.
The  interaction  term  indicates  heterogeneous  slopes;  thus,
the  difference  between  groups  will  depend  on  the  value
of  the  covariate  (Engqvist,  2005).  For  example,  different
levels  of  emotional  stability  are  associated  with  differ-
ent  levels  of  faking  behavior  on  the  extraversion  measure.
Individuals  with  higher  emotional  stability  tended  to  fake
on  the  extraversion  measure  more  than  individuals  with
lower  emotional  stability.  This  finding  supports  the  inter-
actional  perspective  on  faking,  which  explains  faking  as  a
product  of  trait--situation  interactions  (Snell  &  Fluckinger,
2006).  This  perspective  suggests  that  there  are  situational
and  dispositional  factors  that  might  influence  individuals’
ability  or  intention  to  fake.  As  some  individuals  increase
their  scores  more  than  others,  an  interaction  between  the
propensity  to  fake  and  the  set  of  instructions  is  likely  to
occur.  The  presence  of  interaction  makes  the  interpretation
of  the  estimates  problematic.  Interaction  in  faking  studies  is
usually  not  assessed,  but  merely  assumed  as  non-existent,
because  the  effect  size  is  assumed  to  be  the  same  for  all
participants  (Viswesvaran  &  Ones,  1999),  despite  the  fact
that  they  have  different  characteristics.  The  present  study
showed  one  way  to  address  individual  differences  in  fak-
ing  by  including  covariates  and  accommodating  interaction
terms  when  examining  faking  on  personality  measure;  using
the  g-ANCOVA  as  an  alternative  to  the  traditional  ANCOVA.
Not  all  covariates  included  in  the  present  study  had  sig-
nificant  influence  on  faking  for  all  personality  measures,  and
significant  effect  of  covariates  were  found  only  for  particu-
lar  measures.  Nevertheless,  this  study  opens  the  opportunity
for  further  research  involving  covariates.  Previous  research
identified  several  variables  that  have  potential  for  use  as
relevant  covariates.  For  example,  attitudes,  personality
traits,  and  demographic  variables  were  reported  as  being
correlated  with  faking  behavior  (Clark  &  Biderman,  2006;
Goffin  &  Boyd,  2009).  Individual  ability  to  fake  is  related
to  cognitive  ability,  emotional  intelligence,  integrity,  and
social  desirability.  Individual  motivation  to  fake  might  be
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influenced  by  demographics  and  perceptual  factors  (Snell,
Sydell,  &  Lueke,  1999).  Another  study  reported  that  an  indi-
vidual’s  intention  to  fake  his  or  her  responses  is  related
to  his  or  her  beliefs  toward  faking.  These  beliefs  are
influenced  by  several  variables,  including  values,  morals,
religion,  and  personality  traits;  these  beliefs  toward  faking
would  influence  the  subsequent  prevalence  of  faking  behav-
ior  (McFarland  &  Ryan,  2000).  We  suggest  that  involving
a  covariate  or  covariates  in  analysis  will  isolate  the  vari-
ance  due  to  individual  differences  in  faking.  This  idea  is
supported  by  several  models  of  faking  behavior,  for  exam-
ple,  the  trait  activation  model  (Tett  &  Simonet,  2011),  the
faking  decision-tree  model  (Goffin  &  Boyd,  2009),  and  the
integrated  model  of  applicant  faking  behavior  (McFarland  &
Ryan,  2006).  These  models  have  also  proposed  that  faking
is  affected  by  dispositional  factors  (e.g.,  traits,  motiva-
tion,  and  ability).  Since  these  factors  indicate  individual
differences  that  might  affect  faking  variance,  any  research
examining  the  fakability  of  a  measure  should  take  these  fac-
tors  into  account  and  consider  them  as  covariates.  Taking
individual  traits  or  prior  experience  into  account  is  crucial  in
faking  research.  Schwab  (Schwab,  1971)  argues  that  faking
research  is  not  generalizable  if  it  assumes  that  participants
have  no  previous  experience  with  the  personality  measures
being  used.
The  present  study  demonstrated  the  use  of  EffectLite  in
research  on  faking.  Although  not  all  features  of  the  anal-
ysis  of  EffectLite  were  reported  in  this  paper,  one  of  the
most  interesting  features  was  the  software’s  ability  to  pre-
dict  the  average  treatment  effect  for  the  control  group.
First,  EffectLite  can  be  used  to  predict  the  outcome  if
everyone  in  the  treatment  group  received  the  intervention
versus  if  no  one  in  that  group  received  the  intervention.
Second,  the  software  was  used  to  predict  the  outcome  if
participants  in  the  treatment  group  received  the  treatment,
compared  to  if  no  participants  this  group  received  the  treat-
ment  (Kirchmann  et  al.,  2011).  For  example,  the  present
study  found  that  participants  in  the  control  group  would  fake
more  than  the  manipulated  group  on  the  measure  of  consci-
entiousness  if  the  control  group  was  also  induced  to  fake.
This  might  be  because  participants  in  the  control  group  pos-
sessed  higher  levels  of  characteristics  that  support  faking
on  a  measure  of  conscientiousness  than  participants  in  the
manipulated  group.  However,  this  information  could  only  be
obtained  if  researchers  were  to  involve  a  covariate  or  covari-
ates  in  the  analysis.  Research  in  faking  usually  compares
faking  behavior  between  job  applicants  vs.  job  incumbents
(Stokes,  Hogan,  &  Snell,  1993)  or  between  patients  and
non-patients  (Bagby,  Gillis,  Toner,  &  Goldberg,  1991).  Job
applicants  were  found  to  obtain  higher  scores  than  job
incumbents,  meaning  that  job  applicants  are  more  likely  to
fake  their  responses.  However,  it  is  possible  that  the  anal-
ysis  would  find  an  opposite  result  if  the  participants  in  the
job  applicants’  group  were  instead  job  incumbents.  If  this
were  to  happen,  it  would  indicate  that  the  higher  faking
scores  for  applicants  rather  than  incumbents  were  due  to
participants’  traits,  as  opposed  to  being  part  of  the  faking
group.  EffectLite  can  address  this  issue  by  estimating  the
average  effects,  given  a  treatment  condition  and  the  condi-
tional  expectations.  Other  interesting  features  of  EffectLite
that  can  be  utilized  in  research  on  faking  are  its  capability
to  handle  latent  variable  modeling,  which  is  rarely  applied
in  this  area  (Biderman,  2006).
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